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IMPLICATIONS OF LIBEL DOCTRINE FOR
NONDEFAMATORY FALSEHOODS
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
NAT STERN
I. INTRODUCTION
Factually false statements pervade everyday life. Though
allocation between honest error and conscious deception is impossible,
social science supports Mark Twain's assertion that "lying is universal."I
Law, however, attaches sanctions to only a fraction of the universe of
consciously false expression. Calculated falsehoods long forbidden
include perjury, false advertising, misrepresentation of material facts to
2the government, misrepresentation of material facts in connection with
the sale or purchase of securities,3 and defamation. Of these and other
legal prohibitions, it is this last category of libel that may be said to
dominate constitutional jurisprudence on the power to punish factually
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University
College of Law. Amanda Gibson and Haley VanErem provided valuable research
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1. FORREST G. RoBINsON, IN BAD FAITH: THE DYNAMICS OF DECEPTION IN
MARK TWAIN'S AMERICA 213 (1986); see, e.g., Robert S. Feldman et al., Self-
Presentation and Verbal Deception: Do Self-Presenters Lie More?, 24 J. BASIC &
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 163, 166 (2002) (reporting a study that concludes average
rate for most people of two or three lies in a ten-minute conversation). In any event,
the ubiquity of deception hardly requires documentation. See Jonathan D. Varat,
Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious
Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2006) (asserting as self-evident fact the
sweeping existence of deception and citing a range of examples that includes
inducing children's belief in Santa Claus, assuming a feigned identity for undercover
operations, committing fraud to cheat others of possessions, and falsely accusing a
prison guard of misconduct).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (2010); Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1Ob-5 (2010).
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false assertions.4 Conversely, courts have not forged a comprehensive
First Amendment framework to govern falsehoods outside of
defamation.
The Supreme Court's defamation doctrine thus provides the
principal guide to government's ability to bar other types of false
expression. Though criticized as lacking coherence, 6 the Court's
treatment of libel law reveals a number of distinct premises and
principles. Part II of this article discusses these themes and their relation
to First Amendment doctrine in other areas. Part III-A argues that those
themes do not support the proposition that the First Amendment
categorically relegates deliberate factual falsehood to the status of
unprotected speech. With this conclusion as predicate, Part 111-B
addresses the validity of a currently contested law: viz., the ban imposed
by the federal Stolen Valor Act on falsely stating receipt of certain
military honors. This Part ultimately endorses the recent ruling of the
4. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §1.5, at 1-11 (2d ed.
2011) ("Despite the imposition of new first amendment barriers to recovery, the
American law of defamation has exploded in the last decade.... These changes ...
indicate that the law of defamation is and probably will remain an area of substantial
litigation activity.").
5. See Josh M. Parker, Comment, The Stolen Valor Act as Constitutional:
Bringing Coherence to First Amendment Analysis of False Factual Speech
Restrictions Outside of the Defamation Context, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 1503, 1525
(2011), ("[N]either the Supreme Court nor lower courts have endorsed any
systematic approach for evaluating the constitutionality of false-speech restrictions
outside of the defamation context."); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Amicus Curiae
Brief: Boundaries of the First Amendment's "False Statements of Fact" Exception,
6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 343, 348 (2010) ("[T]he Court has never articulated a clear
rule for which knowingly false statements of fact are constitutionally protected and
which are not."). The issue of whether deliberately false statements are categorically
denied constitutional protection is discussed at infra Part III-A.
6. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law
Through Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV.
291, 293 (1994) (describing the law of defamation as "in disarray"); Sheldon W.
Halpem, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-
Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (1990) (disapproving of the "fragmented, confusing
and unsatisfying array of criteria and requirements").
7. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2011).
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Alvarez 8 that the Act
in its current form violates the First Amendment.
II. RECURRING MOTIFS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF DEFAMATION
The Court's libel doctrine, as critics charge, may well not
represent a tight theoretical structure.9 The regime's lack of a single
unifying principle, however, perhaps owes as much to the complex
balance to be struck in this field as to any shortcomings in the Court's
handiwork. Abandoning nearly a half-century ago its view that
defamatory speech enjoys no First Amendment protection,'o the Court
has sought to reconcile First Amendment values with the state interest in
redressing "invasion of . . . reputation and good name."" This enterprise
has been shaped by a series of tenets, assumptions, and strategies.
Separately and collectively, these foundations of the constitutional law of
libel shed light on the reach of government's power to prohibit factually
false speech in a variety of forms.
A. Supplying Deficiencies in the Marketplace of Speech
Allowing damages for libel can be understood as recognition that
a central rationale for free expression does not apply to such speech. The
Court and commentators alike have long enshrined Holmes's position
that truth is better pursued through the joust of free expression than by
government edict:
8. 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), reh'g en banc denied, 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. granted, _ U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 457 (Oct. 17, 2011).
9. See supra note 5.
10. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). N.Y Times is
discussed at infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text. For an expression of the
Court's previous position, see Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952)
(stating in dictum that libelous statements "'are of such slight social value ... that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality"' (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)).
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 771 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974)
(stating aim to attain "proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the
freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment").
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But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution. 12
Neither Holmes's reasoning nor the nature of libel, however,
favors responding to defamatory falsehoods solely through the
"competition of the market."1 3 By its own terms, that competition is a
battle of beliefs.14 As the Court famously stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.:
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) ("[N]o danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.") (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 881 (1963) (stating as one of major
justifications of free expression that it is "the best process for advancing knowledge
and discovering truth"); see also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ("[T]he First Amendment . . . presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection"). But see Frederick Schauer, Facts and
the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 909 (2010) ("Once we fathom the full
scope of factors other than the truth of a proposition that might determine which
propositions individuals or groups will accept and which they will reject ... we can
see that placing faith in the superiority of truth over all of these other attributes of a
proposition in explaining acceptance and rejection requires a substantial degree of
faith in pervasive human rationality and an almost willful disregard of the masses of
scientific and marketing research to the contrary.").
13. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
14. Holmes was explicit on this point later in his Abrams dissent. See id. at 631
("Of course I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations ....
15. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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Under the First Amendment there is no such thing
as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.' 6
This passage has raised questions concerning both the distinction
between fact and opinion" and the constitutional status of factually false
speech as a class.' 8 At a minimum, however, defendants seeking shelter
for defamatory falsehoods find scant support in Holmes's notion of
competing ideas or its philosophical antecedents.19
More pointedly, reliance on the metaphorical marketplace for
"correction" of libel clashes with realities of stain to reputation. An
untrue accusation often has an inherent competitive advantage over the
response it evokes among the audience at which both statements are
aimed. As the Gertz Court observed, "an opportunity for rebuttal seldom
suffices to undo [the] harm of defamatory falsehood;"20 thus, libel law
derives from "our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie."21
16. Id. at 339-40.
17. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part Ill-A.
19. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 52 (Alburey Castell ed.,
Appleton-Century-Croffs 1947) (1859); John Milton, Areopagilica, in 2 COMPLETE
PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 561 (Yale 1959).
20. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
21.. Id; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)
("False statements of fact ... cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective."); Holter v.
WLCY T.V., Inc., 366 So.2d 445, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("'Denials,
retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence of
the original story."' (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46
(1970) abrogated by, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418. U.S. 323 (1974))); Lee
Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the "Actual Malice" Standard, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 889, 906-07 (2008) ("The media ... does not give corrections [during a
political campaign] the same exposure as the false statement."); Christopher P.
Guzelian, Scientific Speech, 93 IOWA L. REV. 881, 926 (2008) ("[A] defendant's
issuing of a retraction will only rarely be effective in undoing the harm of prior false
speech."). This logic resembles the Court's consideration of irreparable injury in
determining the government's obligations under procedural due process. See C.I.R.
v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 629 (1976), superseded by statute, IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-206, § 3401, 112 Stat. 685 (maintaining, "This
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Because of the relative inability of private figures to refute charges
through access to media, the Gertz Court established a lower evidentiary
barrier for private figures bringing libel suits. 22
In addition, the Court's approval of restrictions on certain other
kinds of speech can also be understood in terms of this logic of "market
failure."23 An obvious example is the authority both to forbid and to
require commercial speech to assure that information provided
24
consumers is not false or misleading. Similarly, states may prohibit
charitable fundraisers to make false or misleading representations rather
than expect donors to discover how their contributions were actually
used.25 Nor is the power to remedy imperfections in the marketplace of
speech confined to instances of untruthful communication. In holding
that states may forbid incitement likely to produce imminent
26lawlessness, the Court tacitly acknowledged that ordinary debate is
Court has .. . repeatedly held that, at least where irreparable injury may result from a
deprivation of property pending final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the
Due Process Clause requires that the party whose property is taken be given an
opportunity for some kind of predeprivation or prompt post-deprivation hearing at
which some showing of the probable validity of the deprivation must be made.").
22. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. Gertz held that states could permit plaintiffs
designated as private individuals to recover damages upon a showing of negligence.
Id. at 347. The far more demanding standard of actual malice imposed on public
officials and public figures-i.e., demonstrating knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of truth or falsity-is discussed infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
23. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J.
821, 833 (2008) ("As in the economic market, [market failures in the marketplace of
ideas] are likely to occur when circumstances make open competition impossible.");
For an economic definition, see 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 326 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, & Peter Newman eds., 1987).
24. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 n.24 (1976) (recognizing this power); Mark Spottswood, Falsity,
Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1203,
1275-76 (2009) (citing required warning labels on medications as circumstance
where counterspeech would be inadequate). The power to regulate false and
misleading commercial speech is discussed infra notes 100-04 and accompanying
text.
25. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 624
(2003).
26. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam).
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27
unavailable to avert the threatened harm in such circumstances. Even
the Court's sanction of wholesale bans on public exhibition of obscene
material draws on this type of rationale. In Paris Adult Theatre 1 v.
28Slaton, the Court sustained the state's judgment that such display "has a
tendency to injure the community as a whole," 29 polluting public life in a
way that cannot be cleansed by the presence of more wholesome
.30
expression.
B. Protecting Unworthy Speech for Higher Ends
The Court's condemnation of defamatory falsehood as devoid of
value has not placed libel wholly beyond the bounds of constitutional
protection. Instead, the Court has recognized that holding speakers
strictly accountable for the truth of their statements would deter much
valuable expression. Accordingly, the Court has granted some "strategic
protection" 31 to defamatory falsehood in order to protect "speech that
matters."32 That rationale and its implementation lay at the heart of the
Court's landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.33 The
alleged libel in that case involved criticism of public officials.
Solicitude for such speech, the Court made clear, forms a crucial part of
"the central meaning of the First Amendment." 3 5 Adoption of the First
Amendment represented "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
27. See Blocher, supra note 23, at 834 (describing such speech as representing
"a kind of market failure" in which the absence of "true competition" to the
inflammatory speech heightens the risk of immediate violence).
28. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
29. Id. at 69.
30. See id. at 59 (stating as grounds for denying right to obtain obscene
material in market that "'what is commonly read and seen and heard and done
intrudes upon us all, want it or not' (quoting Alexander Bickel, Dissenting and
Concurring Opinions, 22 PUB. INT. 25, 26 (1971))).
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
32. Id. at 341.
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. Id. at 256.
35. Id. at 273.
2012] NONDEFA MA TORY FALSEHOODS 471
472 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
wide-open . "36 Because "erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate," declared the Court, it "must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to
survive. '" Thus, critics of government who sincerely believe their
factual assertions must not be deterred by the specter of costly litigation
that may culminate in an adverse verdict by a jury perhaps influenced by
distaste for the critic's views.
To prevent such "'self-censorship,"'39 the Court ruled that a
public official seeking to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
must show "actual malice": i.e., that the defendant either knew that the
statement was false or acted with reckless disregard of whether it was
false.4 0 The Court bolstered the potency of this protection by requiring
36. Id. at 270. The idea that speech on public matters lies at the heart of the
First Amendment is a familiar and unquestioned tenet of constitutional
jurisprudence. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, , 130
S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) ("The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and
a necessary means to protect it."); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,
525 U.S. 182, 211 (1999) ("[T]he First Amendment ... guards against the State's
efforts to restrict free discussions about matters of public concern."); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) ("The public interest in having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free
Speech Clause . . . ."); Emerson, supra note 12, at 882-84 (setting forth promotion
of democratic self-governance through freedom of discussion on public affairs as a
principal function of freedom of expression); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York
Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP.
CT. REv. 191, 208 (1964) (noting historical importance of free public speech for "the
stewardship of public officials"); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255-57 (1961).
37. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963)).
38. See id. at 279 (noting the danger of jury bias, "Under such a rule [limiting
defense to demonstration of truth], would-be critics of official conduct may be
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of
the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which 'steer far
wider of the unlawful zone.' The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate." (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)));
LAWRENCE H. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 863-64 (2d ed. 1988) (also
noting danger ofjury bias).
39. N. Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279.
40. Id. at 279-80 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959)).
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officials to establish actual malice with "convincing clarity" rather than
by a preponderance of the evidence.41 Later decisions further confirmed
the formidable nature of this standard. For example, the Court announced
that neither proof of the defendant's hostility toward the plaintiff 42 nor
demonstration that a prudent person would have conducted additional
investigation 4 3 amounts to actual malice. As procedural safeguards, the
Court ruled that failure of a plaintiffs opposing affidavit to support a
reasonable inference of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence
entitles the defendant to summary judgment,44 and that determinations of
45
actual malice at trial are subject to independent appellate review.
Outside the realm of comments on public officials, the Court has
calibrated its "strategic protection" according to a balance of First
Amendment values and plaintiffs' status. In Curtis Publishing Co. v.
46Butts, a fragmented Court effectively applied the actual malice standard
to speech about plaintiffs designated as public figures.4 7 In his crucial
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren explained that such individuals
48
exert an impact on society comparable to that of many officeholders.
On the other hand, the Court in Gertz found that the state has a
heightened interest in enabling private figures to recover damages for
harm to their reputation from defamatory falsehood.49 In addition to their
greater vulnerability to injury,o private individuals have not thrust
41. Id. at 285-86.
42. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964).
43. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).
44. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986). The case
involved a public figure plaintiff See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text for
application of the actual malice standard to public figures.
45. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
46. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
47. Id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result) (stating his adherence
to the actual malice standard in the case of "public figures"). For an explanation of
how the confluence of various opinions in the case produced this outcome, see Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 SUP. CT. REv. 267, 275-78 (1967).
48. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("[M]any
[individuals] who do not hold public office .. . are nevertheless intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape
events in areas of concern to society at large.").
49. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
50. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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51
themselves into the cauldron of public attention and controversy.
Accordingly, the Court did not insist that private figures surmount the
52formidable barrier of the actual malice rule. Instead, states could permit
private persons to recover actual damages upon a showing of
negligence.5 ' Gertz did require proof of actual malice to obtain presumed
or punitive damages;54 in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc. , however, the Court confined this requirement to suits in which the
56defamatory expression involves a matter of public concern.
Despite the modification in Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet of the
robust protection for libel granted in earlier cases, the constitutional law
of defamation remains notable for the considerable shelter accorded
speech that "in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials."s
The idea that otherwise unprotected or "socially worthless"58 speech
warrants protection to avoid a "chilling effect"" on more worthy
expression reverberates well beyond the treatment of defamation. The
most conspicuous example of this philosophy is the Court's overbreadth
doctrine, under which a statute is struck down if "'a substantial number'
of its applications are unconstitutional, 'judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep.", 60 Thus, a defendant whose own speech is
presumed to be unprotected may nonetheless escape penalty because the
law in question trenches on an intolerable amount of protected
51. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. By contrast, public figures have "invite[d]
attention and comment," id. at 345, either by achieving "pervasive fame or
notoriety," id. at 351, or "thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. at 345.
52. Id. at 346-47.
53. Id. at 347.
54. Id. at 349.
55. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
56. See id. at 761 (plurality opinion).
57. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979).
58. Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (2008).
59. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967).
60. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449
n.6 (2008) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-71 (1982)); see
generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844
(1970) (summarizing the overbreadth doctrine).
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expression. As in New York Times, the Court has insisted on carefully
drawn regulation of speech because "First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive." 62
Defamation doctrine's motif of providing a buffer to "speech
that matters" can also be perceived in a different context. The Court has
consistently guarded speech of public import even in the face of Justices'
apparent belief that the content in question has scant value. Thus, in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,63 the Court overturned a verdict for
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a scurrilous but
obviously parodic portrayal of the plaintiff. The Court did not disguise
its low regard for the mock advertisement, describing it as a "distant
cousin" to classic political cartoons and "a rather poor relation at that,"6
accordingly, its removal from public discourse would likely engender
"little or no harm." 66 Nevertheless, again echoing New York Times, the
Court ruled that "adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment" required that public figures like the plaintiff show
actual malice to recover damages even under this non-reputational tort
claim.67 As the Court later explained, citizens "must tolerate insulting,
and even outrageous, speech" in order to preserve this breathing space.
More recently, the Court applied Falwell's animating philosophy in
Snyder v. Phelps.69 There, the Court reversed a damages award for
intentional infliction of mental distress against individuals who displayed
picket signs near a soldier's funeral service expressing the view that God
kills American soldiers as punishment for the nation's toleration of sin. 70
61. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-23 (1972) (defendant's conviction
under overbroad statute invalid even if his speech is presumed to constitute fighting
words).
62. Id. at 522 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
63. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
64. The parody advertisement consisted of an interview in which the plaintiff
"states that his 'first time' was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his
mother in an outhouse." Id. at 48.
65. Id. at 55.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 56.
68. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (citing Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56).
69. U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
70. The Court also invalidated the plaintiff s claim of intrusion upon seclusion.
Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1219-20.
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As in Falwell, the Court in Snyder left little doubt of its assessment of
the picketers' commentary; the picketing, the Court observed, "is
certainly hurtful and its contribution to public discourse may be
negligible." 71 The First Amendment, however, embodies a commitment
"to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not
stifle public debate." 72
Finally, defamation's model of safeguarding the core of speech
by shielding some of its periphery suggests immunity for another type of
factual falsehood. Frederick Schauer has discussed the phenomenon of
widely shared but "plainly, demonstrably, and factually false" beliefs:
e.g., that President Obama was born in Kenya, or that the Holocaust did
not occur.73 Even if government has broad power to proscribe factually
false statements generally,74 it presumably could not bar assertion of such
patent untruths.75 As Mark Tushnet has observed, claims of this nature
are "ideologically inflected," 76 they are bound up with a larger
worldview of a political character.77 A power to suppress this type of
speech, therefore, might allow government to thwart protected
expression associated with the false statements. As in New York Times,
71. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
72. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 1220. In contrast, the Court's acceptance of wide
latitude to forbid false and misleading commercial speech is rooted partly in the
belief that the incentive for advertising creates "little likelihood of its being chilled
by proper regulation and forgone entirely." Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
73. Schauer, supra note 12, at 897-98.
74. This Article disputes the existence of such sweeping authority. See infra
Part III-A.
75. A scholarly consensus exists, for example, that Holocaust denial cannot be
outlawed. See, e.g., Credence Fogo-Schensul, Comments, More than a River in
Egypt: Holocaust Denial, the Internet, and International Freedom of Expression
Norms, 33 GoNz. L. REV. 241, 258 (1998); Gey, supra note 58, at 22; Robert A.
Kahn, Informal Censorship of Holocaust Revisionism in the United States and
Germany, 9 GEo. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 125, 125-26 (1998); Mark Tushnet, "Telling
Me Lies": The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact 20 (2011),
Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11-
02, 2011 available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1737930; Varat, supra note 1, at
1118.
76. Tushnet, supra note 75, at 18.
77. Id. at 19.
78. See id. at 18; compare id., with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) ("[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
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preserving unimpeded debate on public issues entails protection of
factually false speech that sometimes accompanies it.
C. Determining Harm
As Gertz observed, libel laws seek "the compensation of
individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood."8
These laws therefore find their justification in the state's "legitimate
interest in redressing wrongful injury."81 The standard for establishing
"comprehensive reputational injury,"82 however, is not uniform across
plaintiffs and subject matters. As noted earlier, private figures who do
not show actual malice may still recover actual damages, and may obtain
presumed and punitive damages if the defamatory expression involved a
matter of private concern." This sliding scale of evidentiary burden thus
represents an effort to tailor required demonstrations of injury to
distinctive permutations of interests and values. In each instance, though,
recovery is ultimately bottomed on the finding that the defamatory
falsehood has been "injurious" 84 to the plaintiff. The Court's assessment
of injury in libel cases extends in significant ways to the approach toward
harm from falsity in other areas as well.as
Admittedly, plaintiffs who must show actual injury do not face a
formidable constitutional hurdle. Instead, the Court has adopted a
generous notion of such injury commensurate with the principle
underlying libel law: viz., vindication of the "'essential dignity and worth
of every human being."' 86 Accordingly, plaintiffs may be compensated
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.
Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a
convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.").
79. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
80. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
81. Id. at 342.
82. Id. at 347 n.10.
83. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
84. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
85. The question of whether a demonstration of harm is constitutionally
required for the prohibition of nondefamatory falsehoods is discussed supra notes 9-
79 and accompanying text.
86. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
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not only for monetary losses, but also for "impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering." 87 The mild constraint that juries must rely on "competent
evidence" under "appropriate instructions" is largely diluted by the
discretion to quantify these intangible injuries.89 Nevertheless, the Court
has not discarded the principle that harm must be demonstrated where
constitutional standards preclude presumed damages.
Underscoring the indispensable element of targeted injury, the
Court has rejected claims altogether in cases of failure to show that the
disputed statement plausibly amounted to an attack on the plaintiff. In
both New York Times and Rosenblatt v. Baer,90 for example, the inability
to link criticism of a governmental body to an individual charge against
the plaintiff official rendered the suit untenable. As separate grounds in
New York Times, the Court found that criticism of the "police" in
Montgomery, Alabama, did not attribute specific misconduct to City
Commissioner Sullivan.91 Similarly, in Rosenblatt, the Court ruled that
an article critical of a county commission's actions did not constitute a
charge "of and concerning" the plaintiff, a former commissioner.92 These
holdings bear overtones of the common law's group defamation rule,
which bars recovery to a member of a defamed group unless the libelous
statement is reasonably understood to refer specifically to that
individual.93 In both instances, a member of an entity tarred with a
87. Id. at 350.
8 8. Id.
89. See id. ("[T]here need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value
to the injury.").
90. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
91. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288-89 (1964).
92. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 82 (1966).
93. See Diaz v. NBC Universal, Inc., 337 F. App'x. 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[A]
plaintiff's claim is insufficient if the allegedly defamatory statement referenced the
plaintiff solely as a member of a group, unless the plaintiff can show that the
circumstances of the publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is a
particular reference to the plaintiff" (citations omitted)); Beznos v. Nelson, 155
N.W.2d 241, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) ("[I]f defamatory words are used broadly in
respect to a class or group, there is no cause of action unless the words can be made
to apply to a single member of that group or to every member of the group."
(citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977).
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collective brush cannot claim constitutionally cognizable harm absent
evidence that the plaintiff has been singled out for taint.94
The centrality of harm to libel may also have influenced the
disfavor into which the claim of false light invasion of privacy has fallen.
The tort consists of public disclosure of false and "highly offensive"
facts about the plaintiff;9 5 thus, unlike defamation, false light does not
necessarily entail damage to reputation. Over four decades ago, the Court
dealt a devastating blow to false light claims grounded in "reports of
matters of public interest" by requiring proof of actual malice.96 Since
then, the concept of false light has fared poorly among both courts and
commentators, with judicial abolition 9 7 or denial of recognition 98
matched by scholarly condemnation. 99 The faltering status of false light
claims appears to reflect a widespread view that false statements about
persons are not actionable absent a demonstration or likelihood of harm.
94. Even where an inaccurate libelous statement is aimed specifically at the
plaintiff, two doctrines employing similar logic require the suit's dismissal for
absence of harmful impact. Under the substantial truth doctrine, the claim is rejected
because the defendant's statement "although not literally true in every detail, is
substantially true in its implication[s]." Wynberg v. Nat'1 Enquirer, Inc., 564 F.
Supp. 924, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d
1563, 1568 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
(stating that hypothetical suit over report that plaintiff committed thirty-five
burglaries when he had committed thirty-four would likely fail). The incremental
harm doctrine deems nonactionable a defamatory statement contained in expression
whose protected portions harm the defendant's reputation far more than the asserted
libel; see Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp.
742, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 93, at § 652B.
96. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
97. See, e.g., Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (Minn.
1998); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1994); Renwick v. News &
Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. 1984).
98. See Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y. 1993); Elm Med.
Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Mass. 1989); Zinda v. La. Pac.
Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Wis. 1989).
99. J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
783, 785-86 (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy:
The Light that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 421-35, 452-53 (1989); Harvey L.
Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy--Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253-60 (1990).
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By contrast, the power to curb false speech with obvious links to
definite harms arouses little dispute. Even as the Court lifted the First
Amendment stature of commercial speech, 00 it invoked Gertz to endorse
broad power to regulate false and misleading advertising. o Later
promulgating a formal test for commercial speech regulation, the Court
affirmed the state's authority to "ban forms of communication more
likely to deceive the public than to inform it.,, 102 As suggested earlier, the
injury to consumers and others from deceptive speech about goods and
services is intuitively apparent.103 Even here, however, the Court will not
lightly infer damage from factually truthful commercial speech that the
state contends is potentially deceptive. Rather, the government must
"demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will
in fact alleviate them to a material degree." 1 4
This approach to falsity's causal link with likely harm is broadly
congruent with the regulatory frameworks for securities transactions and
for fraud. For example, in the securities context, Rule lOb-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act forbids buyers and sellers of securities, inter
alia, from making untrue statements of material facts or from omitting
such facts in connection with these transactions. 05 At the same time,
misrepresentation does not automatically trigger a successful claim;
plaintiffs must show that their loss resulted from detrimental reliance on
the misleading statement.106 In a sense, the concept of fraud on the
100. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 763 (1976) ("[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
most urgent political debate.").
101. See id. at 771-72.
102. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (citations omitted).
103. See supra note 23-24 and accompanying text.
104. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (rejecting state's
argument that solicitation by accountants of potential clients might lead to fraud,
among other things, because the argument was unsubstantiated by the record).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011). The Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgated the rule pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2010). See generally Colloquium, Happy
Birthday I Ob-5: 50 Years of Antifraud Regulation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S-I to S-
126 (1993).
106. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005); see also
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market represents an effort to navigate the complex relationship between
falsity and harm in this context. Under this principle, plaintiffs may
recover damages based on the impact of a misrepresentation on a stock's
market price rather than on the buyer's or seller's direct reliance on that
statement.107 As to First Amendment constraints on actions for fraud
generally, the Court has starkly refused to regard falsity without more as
sufficient grounds for liability. "[I]n a properly tailored fraud action . . .
[fjalse statement alone does not subject a [defendant] to fraud
liability.,,o In the same vein, probabilistic assessments of harm do not
suffice to ensnare even a calculating perpetrator of fraud. Rather, the
complainant must demonstrate that the intended fraud was successfully
consummated.109
Even prohibition of perjury, arguably a pure instance of deeming
falsity per se as actionable, is ultimately rooted in notions of indisputable
harm. As a recent book on the subject concluded, "[p]erjury clearly poses
a threat to the judicial system and the administration of justice"' 0
transcending its effect on the case in which it is committed."' This
manifest and fundamental injury no doubt accounts for the severity with
which the Court has allowed perjury to be treated. Thus, criminal
defendants' right to testify does not shield them from penalty for
perjury,"l including enhancement of their sentence at a trial that led to
Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35 (1975) ("[A]
putative plaintiff, who neither purchases nor sells securities but sues instead for
intangible economic injury such as loss of a noncontractual opportunity to buy or
sell, is more likely to be seeking a largely conjectural and speculative recovery in
which the number of shares involved will depend on the plaintiffs subjective
hypothesis.") (denying cause of action to sue under SEC Rule 1 Ob-5 where party
claiming damages has not bought or sold shares).
107. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185
(2011); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on
the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 908 (1989).
108. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620
(2003).
109. See id.
110. JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS 433 (2011).
111. See id at 441 ("Lying under oath that goes unproven and unpunished
breeds a cynicism that undermines the foundations of any society that aspires to fair
play and the rule of law. It undermines civilization itself.").
112. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986); United States v. Grayson,
438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978).
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their conviction.113 Witnesses falsely testifying at a grand jury
proceeding are likewise subject to prosecution.114
D. Acknowledging Epistemic Doubt in the Face of Official Truth
Defamatory falsehoods may not be susceptible to remedy
through the marketplace of ideas;" 5 the experience of libel law, however,
counsels against facile surrender of First Amendment safeguards to
allegations of factually false assertions. As Vincent Blasi has noted,
Holmes's analysis drew as much from scientific methodology and its
fallibilist tenets as from economic analogy." 6 Scientific skepticism
toward claims of final truth accords with the democratic premise that
government may not prescribe unassailable orthodoxies." 7  This
epistemic humility points to the need to base libel damages on substantial
confidence that the defendant's statement definitely conveyed to third
parties a provably false derogatory assertion about the plaintiff.
The main arena in which this philosophy has been implemented
is litigation over the so-called fact-opinion distinction. Legions of lower
courts after Gertz, relying on that decision's famous dicta,'
distinguished between protected expressions of opinion and actionable
113. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1993).
114. United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977).
115. See supra Part II.A.
116. See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT.
REv. 1, 19-21 (2004); see also PATRICIA GOSLING & BART NOORDAM, MASTERING
YOUR PHD: SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS IN THE DOCTORAL YEARS AND BEYOND (2006),
available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/gm3kl2855023rl3g/ ("'There is
no place for dogma in science. The scientist is free, and must be free to ask any
question, to doubt any assertion, to seek for any evidence, to correct any errors."'
(quoting J. Robert Oppenheimer)).
117. See W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith within.");
see also Gey, supra note 58, at 20 ("[W]hile the democratic government continues to
describe itself as such, everything is always open to question; nothing is
sacrosanct.").
118. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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statements of fact.119 In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,120 however, the
Court rejected a categorical dichotomy between reachable fact and
privileged opinion.121 Blanket immunity for "opinion," the Court noted,
would protect speech taking the nominal form of opinion but implying
122
assertions of fact. Moreover, established First Amendment principles
already safeguarded libel defendants from improper suppression of their
views.123 Speakers could not be punished for statements "that cannot
'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts"' about the plaintiff.124
The Milkovich Court highlighted as well its decision in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,125 which embodied the proposition that "a
statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before
there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations ...
where a media defendant is involved.,,1
2 6
The Milkovich Court's dismissal of the fact-opinion shibboleth
should not obscure its insistence that actionable libel contain a core of
provable falsity. Indeed, the overall continuity of the post-Milkovich
landscape with the fact-opinion regime suggests a consensus that the
Court did not appreciably lower the constitutional burden on plaintiffs.127
119. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431-32 (8th Cir.
1989); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 977-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For an overview,
see Jeffrey E. Thomas, A Pragmatic Approach to Meaning in Defamation Law, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 373-76 (1999).
120. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
121. Id. at 18, 21.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id. at 19.
124. Id. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
125. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
126. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20.
127. See Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724, 727 (1st
Cir. 1992) ("[W]hile eschewing the fact/opinion terminology, Milkovich did not
depart from the multi-factored analysis that had been employed for some time by
lower courts seeking to distinguish between actionable fact and nonactionable
opinion."). A sampling of decisions from before and after Milkovich supports the
First Circuit's observation. Throughout both periods, courts have sought to discern
whether a statement implies a defamatory fact by ascertaining the statement's
impression on the hypothetical average reasonable reader or listener. See, e.g.,
Bustos v. A & E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 2011); Damon
v. Moore, 520 F.3d 98, 103-04 (1st Cir. 2008); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068,
1080 (9th Cir. 2005); Moss v. Camp Pemigewassett, Inc., 312 F.3d 503, 510 (1st
Cir. 2002); Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 529 (4th Cir. 1999); Potomac Valve &
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As an epistemic matter, then, libel plaintiffs must provide strong
assurance that the disputed statement can be plausibly construed as
communicating a defamatory assertion that is verifiably false. Given the
subjective perception of meaning,12 courts should hesitate to ascribe
objective content to ambiguous expression. In this regard, the high
threshold for finding provably false speech has long led the Court to
resist libel claims rooted in overly literal bases for liability. Thus, suits
over charges that a plaintiff in one case had engaged in "blackmail"' 2 9
and another was a "traitor"13 0 were rejected because these terms could
not reasonably be understood as accusations of criminal behavior.
Instead, viewed in the context of a heated dispute each amounted to
"rhetorical hyperbole.""'
In other aspects of libel, too, the Court's recognition of semantic
uncertainty has produced a tempered approach to the question of factual
falsity. This functional perspective, for example, has informed the
Court's treatment of altered quotations. Even deliberate misattribution of
certain language to a plaintiff does not inevitably rise to the level of
actionable libel. Rather, the Court held in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc.132 that a defendant can be held liable for such revision
only if the alteration materially changed the meaning conveyed by the
Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1288-90 (4th Cir. 1987); Mr.
Chow of N.Y. v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1985); Oilman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 264, 273-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969
A.2d 1097, 1114 (N.J. 2009); Thomas v. Tel. Publ'g Co., 929 A.2d 993, 1015 (N.H.
2007); Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 314 (Mo. 1993); Dunlap v.
Wayne, 716 P.2d 842, 848-49 (Wash. 1986); Okun v. Super. Ct., 629 P.2d 1369,
1374-78 (Cal. 1981); Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion Under the First
Amendment: Reflections on Alfred Hill, "Defamation and Privacy Under the First
Amendment," 100 COLUM. L. REv. 294, 322 (2000) ("Most courts considering
opinion since Milkovich have... reached the result that they likely would have before
the Supreme Court decided the case.").
128. See generally Thomas, supra note 119, at 339-84 (advancing a
"pragmatics paradigm" for examining the role of meaning in defamation law).
129. Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970).
130. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 285 n.16 (1974).
131. Id. at 285-86; Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 14.
132. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
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plaintiffs original statement.'33 There, the Court carefully screened from
the article at issue those passages in which reasonable jurors could
conclude that the discrepancies between Masson's reported and actual
words would harm his reputation.' 34 Thus, much as impermissible
overbreadth must be both "real" and "substantial,"' 3 5 so must actionable
defamatory falsehood as well.
Outside of libel, commercial speech offers a comparable
illustration of how epistemic considerations inform the bounds of
regulatory power. On the one hand, the state's ample authority to curb
false, deceptive, and misleading speechl36 stems from confidence in three
forms of knowledge. First, prototypical advertising of the terms on which
goods or services are offered-e.g., the prices of prescription drugs at
issue in the seminal case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.137-normally arouses little
doubt about the factual content of the message being conveyed. In
addition, the relative objectivity of such information makes it subject to
official review without fear of partisan overreaching by the state. Finally,
advertisers can typically assess the reliability of their claims: "The truth
of commercial speech . . . may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in
that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a
specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably
knows more about than anyone else." 3 8
At the same time, regulatory prerogative is more tenuous when
the capacity for objective disproof is absent. Much contemporary
commercial expression consists of corporate image advertising, "which
describes the corporation itself, its activities or its views, but does not
133. Id. at 517.
134. See id. at 522-25.
135. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
136. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
137. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
138. Id. at 771-72 n.25; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) ("[C]ommercial speakers have
extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well
situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages . . . .").
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explicitly describe any products or services sold by the corporation."l39
As with slogans broadly proclaiming the superiority of a product or
service,1'4 the subjectivity of corporate image advertising appears to
preclude its prohibition.14 Similarly, where advertising is factually
accurate and not demonstrably misleading, the Court has been loath to
permit its suppression on the ground that foolish consumers might
adversely rely on false inferences. Thus, the Court has repeatedly struck
down bans on truthful lawyer advertising based on fears that potential
clients would fail to grasp the nature or quality of services being offered.
Rejecting this rationale, the Court has struck down prohibitions on
advertising about the price of routine legal services,142 advertising areas
of practice except in officially prescribed verbiage, 14 and including
illustrations in an advertisement.
E. Declining to Waive Core First Amendment Tenets
Defamatory falsehoods, though devoid of worth, do not fall
wholly outside the orbit of First Amendment protection. Selective shelter
of some libelous speech allows valuable expression to flourish.145
Protection of libel, however, is not only instrumental. The Court has also
stated that sanctions for libelous falsehood do not warrant wholesale
suspension of fundamental free speech principles. This stance, intimated
in the New York Times declaration that "libel can claim no talismanic
139. SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SOURCEBOOK ON CORPORATE IMAGE AND CORPORATE
ADVOCACY ADVERTISING, 95TH CONG., 2d Sess. 1156 (1978); see generally C.C.
Laura Lin, Note, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 459 (1988).
140. See, e.g., Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 504 (5th
Cir. 2000) (deeming Papa John's slogan "Better ingredients. Better pizza" as
protected puffery). For another example of probable puffery see JIMMY JOHN'S,
http://www.jimmyjohns.com/menu/menu.aspx (offering the "world's greatest
gourmet sandwiches") (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
141. See Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commerical Speech,
User-Generated Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 774-
75 (2010).
142. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977).
143. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 195 n.6, 205-06 (1982).
144. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641-49 (1985).
145. See supra Part II.B.
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immunity from constitutional limitations,,,146 was emphatically affirmed
in a case that did not involve libel at all.
The idea that defamation lies beyond the reach of the First
Amendment can be traced to dicta in the Court's 1942 decision in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.147 There, the Court upheld Chaplinsky's
conviction for having uttered "fighting words."l 4 8 In explaining the
state's power to punish such speech, the Court famously recited
categories of expression "the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."l 49 The roster
included "the- lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.,,5s
A half-century later, the Court took occasion in R.A. V v. City of
St. Paul5 1 to refine the ostensible sweep of these passages. R.A.V. had
been convicted for burning a cross on the yard of an African-American
family under an ordinance banning the display of a burning cross or other
symbol that would foreseeably "'arouse[] anger, alarm, or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."1 52 A
narrowing construction by the Minnesota Supreme Court limited the
ordinance's reach to expression that could be considered "fighting
words" under Chaplinsky.15 3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that Chaplinsky's language licensed restrictions on the
content of speech in the case of fighting words and other classes of
expression enumerated in that opinion.' 54 The Court further recognized
that declarations since Chaplinsky appeared to place these areas entirely
beyond the bounds of the Free Speech Clause. 5 5 Nevertheless, the Court
146. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
147. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
148. Id. at 572-74. The Court described this type of speech as words "which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Id. at 572.
149. Id. at 571-72.
150. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
151. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
152. Id. at 379-80.
153. Id. at 381.
154. See id. at 382-83 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
155. See id. at 383 ("We have sometimes said that these categories of
expression are 'not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,' (quoting
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rejected as overly literal an interpretation that government may wholly
ignore central First Amendment mandates when forbidding these kinds
of speech. In particular, the Court repudiated any suggestion that these
realms of expression could be made "vehicles for content discrimination
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content."l 57
To the Court, St. Paul's ordinance constituted such a vehicle
both formally and functionally. On its face, the ban selectively targeted
only those fighting words pertaining "to one of the specified disfavored
11158topics: Even within an otherwise unprotected class of speech,
however, the state may not single out for "special prohibitions . . .
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." 59 Moreover, the
Court asserted, the ban in practice effected viewpoint discrimination as
well.160 Since the prohibited words were far more likely to be employed
by advocates of intolerance than by their opponents,' the ordinance was
fraught with danger that the city sought "to handicap the expression of
particular ideas."l 62
Nor did the Court leave doubt that the analysis fatal to St. Paul's
ordinance would govern prohibitions of libel as well. In support of its
reasoning, the Court invoked a distinction between the permissible
proscription of libel and the invalid "content discrimination of
proscribing only libel critical of the government"l63 However little regard
the First Amendment may have for a category of speech, it still does not
condone "censorship of ideas" imposed through content discrimination
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)) . . . . or that the 'protection of the
First Amendment does not extend' to them (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984)) (additional citations omitted)).
156. Id. at 384 ("Our cases surely do not establish the proposition that the First
Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of
such proscribable expression, so that the government 'may regulate [them] freely."'
(quoting id. at 400 (White, J., concurring))).
157. Id. at 383-84.
158. Id. at 391.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 391-92.
162. Id. at 393-94.
163. Id. at 384.
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within that category.6M Thus, defamation-like fighting words and other
"low-value" speech -is not excluded from the solicitude of the First
Amendment's most jealously guarded values.
III. THE STATUS OF NONDEFAMATORY FALSE FACTUAL ASSERTIONS:
THE STOLEN VALOR ACT AS LITMUS TEST
The themes that emerge from Supreme Court libel decisions,
including incorporation by reference in R.A. V, are instructive on
authority to restrain other factually false expression. Unlike some
commentators,166 however, the Court has not explicitly articulated a
systematic approach to novel prohibitions of false speech. At a basic
doctrinal level, the presumption about such bans hinges on a proper
reading of Chaplinsky's classic list of subordinate classes of speech. If
the inclusion of libel is read as a proxy for the entire category of false
expression, then factually false statements generallyl67 should be deemed
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and . . . of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.", 68
Conversely, application of expressio unius would mean that Chaplinsky's
specification left open for consideration protection of other kinds of false
expression.
This Part argues that the intersection of themes governing the
Court's treatment of defamation is too complex and nuanced to infer the
164. Id. at 393; see id. at 392 ("The point of the First Amendment is that
majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech
on the basis of its content.").
165. See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and
Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 177-78 (1997).
166. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 5, at 24-37 (proposing four-factor test to
determine whether restriction of false factual speech violates First Amendment);
Spottswood, supra note 24 (proposing broad protection for factually false but
sincerely believed speech while limiting protection of insincere false speech to
extent needed to avoid deterring sincere speech, based largely on the two categories'
respective positive and negative contributions to the stock of knowledge).
167. See Tushnet, supra note 75, at 15 ("[W]hat we are dealing with here is a
standard 'level of generality' problem.").
168. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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susceptibility of all false statements to regulatory discretion. Reliance on
Court pronouncements of the unworthiness of factually false speech
removes this language from the broader context of the Court's
jurisprudence. The Court has not endorsed the proposition that false
statements of fact are so categorically beyond the pale of constitutional
cognizance that the state may punish any of them on the showing of
merest rationality.169 On the contrary, recent Court decisions have
registered a deep reluctance to expand the set of proscribable genres of
speech beyond those already established. The indiscriminate inclusion of
all false factual assertions would have ramifications at odds with
premises underlying the Court's defamation doctrine and the First
Amendment principles upon which it rests. Thus, the speech suppressed
by the Stolen Valor Act cannot be simply presumed to be "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
[it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.,170
Rather, the government must demonstrate that the damage produced by
such speech is sufficiently substantial to overcome First Amendment
barriers to censorship. To date, no showing of intrinsic harm to justify a
blanket ban has been presented.
A. The Fallacy of Wholesale Exclusion ofFalse Speech from First
Amendment Visibility
It is easy enough to string together quotations to seemingly show
that the Court has thoroughly banished false statements from the realm of
169. The rational relationship or rational basis standard is notoriously easy for
the government to meet. See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15
(1993) ("On rational-basis review ... those attacking the rationality of the legislative
classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might
support it." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were
Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of
Smith, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1189,.1197 (2008) ("Traditional rational basis review
only asks whether any theoretical, or hypothesized, rational relationship exists to a
legitimate governmental interest; the challenger must essentially prove a negative by
eliminating any real or imagined basis for the enactment.").
170. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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protected expression. The Court's opinion in R.A. V, however, cautions
against hyper-literal and de-contextualized constructions of such isolated
passages.172 Ironically, the notion that these passages reflect a default
presumption that false speech is categorically unprotected is belied by
Gertz itself. Even as the Court decreed that "there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact,"' 73 its holding conferred considerable
protection on this speech.174 To infer that this analysis manifests an
intention to regard all factually false speech as an undifferentiated,
unprotected whole represents a simplistic and unwarranted leap in logic.
Designation of all factually false speech as an unprotected
category clashes with the more cautious, multifaceted philosophy
displayed in the Court's libel jurisprudence. To hold that false statements
are uniformly unprotected by the First Amendment "except in a limited
set of contexts where such protection is necessary 'to protect speech that
matters'"' 7 5 assumes one's conclusion and exalts one element of the
Court's analysis to the exclusion of others.16 Wholesale relegation of
factually false expression to the status of unprotected category would
stem from the premise that "it may be appropriately generalized that
171. In his dissenting opinion in Alvarez, Judge Bybee did exactly that. See
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011). A sampling of such
misleading quotations includes Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,
743 (1983) ("[F]alse statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech." (citations omitted)), and Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171
(1979) ("Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment
credentials." (citation omitted)).
172. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
173. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
174. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also Alvarez, 617 F.3d
at 1203 ("Gertz s statement that false factual speech is unprotected, considered in
isolation, omits discussion of essential constitutional qualifications on that
proposition.").
175. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1219 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 341).
176. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CH-I. L. REV. 413, 477
(1996) ("[N]ear absolute protection [is] given to false but nondefamatory statements
of fact outside the commercial realm . . . ; even a concern with chilling true speech
would not explain such sweeping protection of speech that disserves
understanding.").
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within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that
no process of case-by-case adjudication is required." 17  Such a
generalization hardly seems warranted across the entire landscape of
even deliberately false speech. It is not self-evident, for example, that a
misrepresentation of identity in the course of investigative reporting is of
such intrinsic "evil" that no "case-by-case adjudication" is needed before
it is subject to sanction. 7 1
Perhaps strategic considerations 79 afford some latitude for this
type of deception, but this rationale does not address a multitude of other
false statements that produce no appreciable harm. Given the serious and
obvious injury that justifies damages for libel,180 the idea of false
expression as punishable apart from demonstrable harm is unpersuasive.
In his concurring opinion in Alvarez, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski offered
a catalogue of "white lies, exaggerations and deceptions"' presumably
subject to penalty under a theory that factual falsity is categorically
proscribable. That these untruths are typically self-servingl82 does not
mean that they are unprotected. State power to stamp out these everyday
departures from the truth would not only be Orwellian; it would reverse
the usual assumptions of the First Amendment.183 It is government's
177. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (applying this
generalization to child pornography as defined by state statute at issue).
178. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522 (4th
Cir. 1999) (refusing to permit Food Lion to recover damages on showing of less than
actual malice where reporters used false resumes to gain access to Food Lion
supermarkets). The use of "testers" posing as interested home buyers to discover
whether certain brokers engage in racial discrimination raises similar issues. See,
e.g., Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Chapman, 411 F. Supp. 1195, 1196-97 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
181. United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673-75 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
182. See, e.g., id. at 674 ("I go to church every Sunday" (internal quotations
omitted)).
183. Nor do Chief Judge Kozinki's categories encompass all the presumably
protected false speech that might be susceptible to punishment under a blanket
power to ban falsehoods. For example, detrimental reliance on incorrect, objectively
unsubstantiated, but sincerely believed predictions might be subject to sanction. See,
e.g., 'Rapture': Believers Perplexed after Prediction Fails, BBC NEWS (May 22,
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184
burden to justify restrictions of expression. Absent express recognition
from the Court, sweeping authority to ban false statements of any stripe
should not be presumed. Of course, even the quotidian examples cited by
Chief Judge Kozinski might not escape sanction in circumstances where
they foresecably caused a harm that the state has a right to prevent, such
as inducing adverse financial reliance. To regard falsity in of itself as
such a harm, however, exceeds the scope of power that has thus far been
acknowledged by the Court.
Nor does obscenity's status as an unprotected category of speech
186
refute the idea that harm is a requisite element of such categories.
While the Court's definition of obscenity does not specify harm,1 87 the
rationale for its suppression does. The Court has accepted a legislative
determination that a connection exists between the availability of
obscene material and antisocial behavior. More broadly, the Court
acknowledged the harmful effect on "'the tone of the society"' that the
dissemination of obscenity was thought to produce.189 Of course, it could
be argued that dishonesty in the aggregate exerts a similarly corrosive
effect on society.19 0 To justify blanket authority to ban false statements in
all forms, however, this rationale would have to rely on the same lenient
2011, 5:39 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13489641 (describing
costs incurred in anticipation of prediction that Rapture would occur on May 21,
2011).
184. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000); Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983).
185. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
186. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Bybee, J., dissenting), cert. granted, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011)
(describing the Court's obscenity jurisprudence as an "embarrassment" to the
concept of harm requirement).
187. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) ("[W]e now confine the
permissible scope of [obscenity] regulation to works . . . which, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.").
188. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973).
189. Id. at 59 (quoting Alexander Bickel, Dissenting and Concurring
Opinions, 22 PUB. INT. 25, 25 (1971)).
190. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
63 (Vintage Books 1979) (discussing "cumulative harm" of individual deceptive
practices).
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scrutiny that the Court invoked in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.'9 1
There, the Court permitted the state to prohibit obscenity on the basis of
"unprovable assumptions"' 92 about its effects. Unlike factual falsehood
in general, however, obscenity had already long been established as one
of the traditionally proscribable classes of speech.193 Moreover, even
within that tradition, obscenity occupies a distinctive niche in First
Amendment jurisprudence subjecting it to extraordinary control.194
Absent an unequivocal signal from the Court, it should not be assumed
that false expression categorically belongs on the list, much less that
government can ban any portion of it on the lightest of premises.
Such a signal has not been forthcoming. On the contrary, the
Court in recent terms has refused to expand the categories of unprotected
speech, or otherwise to sanction suppression of speech simply for lacking
value. Most pointedly, the Court in United States v. Stevens,'9 5
emphatically rejected an invitation to recognize a new class of excluded
expression. At issue was a federal statute criminalizing the commercial
creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty as described
in the legislation. 9 6 According to the government, such depictions
represented a logical addition to Chaplinsky's list of "'well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.""
97
The Court, however, took a more stringent view of the criteria for
inclusion on the list. It observed that these "'historic and traditional
categories long familiar to the bar' included obscenity, defamation,
191. 413 U.S. 49(1973).
192. Id. at 61.
193. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see
also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("[O]bscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
194. See Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT'L
L. 299, 300 (2008) (calling obscenity an "anomaly" in the constitutional system of
freedom of expression); Karen M. Markin, It's Not the Thought That Counts: A
Political Economy of Obscenity, 58 S.C. L. REV. 883, 883 (2007) (stating that
obscenity is traditionally subject to more control than other forms of expression).
195. 559 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006).
197. Stevens, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1584-85 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 571-72).
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fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.'9 The Court
acknowledged that this roster was not exhaustive, noting its 1982
decision in New York v. Ferberl99 designating child pornography as such
a category.20 Ferber, however, represented a "special case" in which
production of the forbidden material was inextricably intertwined with
the abuse of children.201 Neither that decision nor others identifying
unprotected classes of speech had "establish[ed] a freewheeling authority
to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First
Amendment." 202
Accordingly, the Stevens Court would not conduct "a simple
cost-benefit analysis" to determine categories of speech entitled to no
203First Amendment protection. Rather, the Court would be guided by the
bedrock judgment embodied in the First Amendment that the benefits of
free speech exceed its costs.204 That judgment precludes denial of
protection to certain speech simply because that speech "is not worth
it."205 Thus, the features that characterized previously recognized
proscribable classes of expression did not "permit the Government to
imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or
unnecessary .... ,0o Refusing therefore to perform "an ad hoc calculus
of costs and benefits," the Court instead struck down the challenged law
on the ground that depictions of animal cruelty did not qualify as a
"historically unprotected" category of speech.207
198. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (citation omitted).
199. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
200. Stevens, 559 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1585-86; Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at
1586 ("Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically
unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our
case law.").
201. Id. at 1586 (citation omitted).
202. Id.; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring in judgment) ("I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this
Court are free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected
by the First Amendment is most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most
protection, and which is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection.").
203. Stevens, 559 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
204. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
205. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
206. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
207. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
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Any doubt that the Court would rigorously enforce this strict
definition of unprotected speech was dispelled last term in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants' Association.208 There, the Court invalidated a
California law forbidding the sale to minors of "violent video games." 2 09
In a virtual replay of the Stevens opinion, the Court affirmed that "new
categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a
legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be
tolerated."210 Only "persuasive evidence that a novel restriction . . . is
part of a long . . . tradition of proscription" could overcome the First
Amendment's overwhelming presumption against prohibitions directed
at the content of speech.211 Against a long tradition of children's
literature presenting vivid depictions of violence, such evidence to
212
support California's ban was sorely lacking. The state therefore could
not deny violent video games to minors simply because the social costs
of this type of speech were thought to outweigh its value.213 As with
other content-based restrictions, the Court subjected the law to strict
scrutiny.214 Almost inevitably,215 the statute failed to meet this
216demanding standard.
Also last term, the Court issued a decision philosophically if not
doctrinally aligned with Stevens and Brown. In Snyder v. Phelps,2 17 the
Court overturned an award of damages against a church and its members
for picketing at the funeral of a military service member. A number of
the signs asserted a link between the death of American soldiers and the
nation's tolerance of homosexuality. 2 18 Unlike Stevens and Brown, the
outcome in Snyder hinged largely on the expression's classification as
208. -U.S._ , 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011).
209. Id at , 131 S. Ct. at 2732.
210. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
211. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
212. See id at , 131 S. Ct. at 2736.
213. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
214. Id at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
215. See id at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 ("'It is rare that a regulation restricting
speech because of its content will ever be permissible."' (quoting United States v.
Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000))).
216. See id at , 131 S. Ct. at 2738-42.
217. U.S. ,131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).




commentary on a matter of public concern. As in those two cases,
however, the Court underscored that speech could not be suppressed
based on an assessment of its low worth,220 even as the Court appeared to
intimate endorsement of that assessment.221
That much false speech is doubtless of little worth, then, does
not mean that all of it is proscribable. Stevens 's enumeration of classes of
speech "fully outside the protection of the First Amendment" 222 specified
libel and fraud, but not the entire category of false factual expression of
which they form so small a part.223 Stevens emphasized, and Brown
echoed, the Court's reluctance to augment the established list of
224
unprotected categories. Extrapolation from the list's particular classes
of falsehoods to false speech generally would represent a major
225
expansion at odds with the Court's cautious approach. It is more
consistent with the Court's philosophy to assume that prohibitions of
false factual statements other than the specified subsets are subject to
ordinary First Amendment principles.
Finally, the Court's concern with troubling implications of
power claimed by the government in Stevens applies with far greater
219. See id. at ,_ 131 S. Ct. at 1216 ("The 'content' of Westboro's signs
plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large"); id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at
1219 ("Given that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a matter of public
concern, that speech is entitled to 'special protection' under the First Amendment.").
220. See id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."' (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989))).
221. See id. at ,_ 131 S. Ct. at 1218 ("[T]he applicable legal term-
'emotional distress'-fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro's choice added to
Mr. Snyder's already incalculable grief"); id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 ("Westboro
believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about
Westboro. Westboro's funeral picketing is certainly hurtfil and its contribution to
public discourse may be negligible.").
222. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _ 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586
(2010).
223. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
224. Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2734 (2011) (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2538).
225. See United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he
Court's standard list of categorically exempt speech has never used the phrase 'false
statements of fact.' Instead, the Court has limited itself to using the words
defamation (or libel) and fraud.").
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magnitude here. To regard depictions of illegally wounding or killing
animals as falling into a 'First Amendment Free Zone"' 226 would sustain
authority of "alarming breadth."227 Depictions of illegal instances of
hunting and fishing or the "humane slaughter of a stolen cow," for
228
example, could be made the objects of criminal prohibition. These
finite examples of government overreach, however, pale in comparison
with the range of innocuous untruths that the state could forbid if factual
falsehood were deemed a "'First Amendment Free Zone."' 2 29 Of course,
the government would presumably reserve such power to pursue more
"serious" deception.230 The Stevens Court, however, dismissed such a
justification: "We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely
because the Government promised to use it responsibly." 23 1 Moreover,
the very notion of responsibility of this kind is constitutionally
problematic. Overturning a conviction for use of a vulgarity in public,
the Court in Cohen v. California232 pointed to the lack of a "readily
ascertainable general principle" by which it could identify especially
"distasteful" words as constitutional pariahs.233 Leaving determination of
punishable falsehoods wholly to government discretion would remove
the judicial touchstone of principled distinctions altogether.
B. The Stolen Valor Act: A Case Study ofRepellant but Protected Lies
The Stolen Valor Act (SVA) appears likely to become the
vehicle through which the Court resolves the First Amendment status of
nondefamatory (and non-fraudulent) falsehoods. The Act's key language
provides:
Whoever falsely represents himself or herself ...
to have been awarded any decoration or medal
authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of
226. Stevens, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting Bd. of Airport
Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)).
227. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1588.
228. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1588.
229. Id. at 130 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574).
230. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1577.
231. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1591.
232. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
233. See id. at 25.
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the United States [or] any of the service medals or
badges awarded to the members of such forces ...
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
234
than six months, or both.
The SVA has received mixed treatment among both courts1 and
236
commentators. The most extensive analysis and spirited debate
234. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006).
235. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), cert
granted, _ U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 457 (2011) (invalidating conviction under SVA),
with United States v. Strandlof, No. 10-1358, 2012 WL 247995 (10th Cir. Jan. 27,
2012) (upholding conviction under SVA for false claim that defendant was awarded
Purple Heart and Silver Star under "breathing space principle" of First Amendment),
and United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 819-22 (W.D. Va. 2011)
(finding that SVA's ban on false claim of receipt of military honors does not violate
First Amendment). A number of courts have upheld the SVA's prohibition under 18
U.S.C.A. § 704(a) on wearing unauthorized military medals or decorations. See
United States v. Swisher, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1243-45 (D. Idaho 2011); United
States v. Perelman, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1238-39 (D. Nev. 2010); United States v.
McGuinn, No. 07 Cr 471(KNF), 2007 WL 3050502, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
2007).
236. Compare, e.g., Parker, supra note 5, at 21-37 (asserting the
constitutionality of SVA under the author's proposed test); and Tushnet, supra note
75, at 24 (stating the view that SVA is constitutional); and Volokh, supra note 5, at
350 (arguing that the SVA is "probably" constitutional if limited to knowingly false
claims), with Jeffery C. Barnum, Comment, False Valor: Amending the Stolen Valor
Act to Conform with the First Amendment's Fraudulent Speech Exception, 86 WASH.
L. REV 841 (2011) (arguing that SVA in current form violates First Amendment but
can be amended to qualify as constitutional anti-fraud measure); Stephanie L. Gal,
Note, Resolving the Conflict Between the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and the First
Amendment, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 223 (2011) (stating the same); and David S. Han,
Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment's Protection of Self-Defining
Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv., available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1945248 (arguing that SVA impermissibly infringes self-definition
interest protected by First Amendment); and Beth F. Lloyd-Jones, Note, The Stolen
Valor Conundrum: How to Honor the Military Whilte Protecting Free Speech, 38
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 153 (2012) (finding SVA to violate the
First Amendment); and Kathryn Smith, Hey! That's My Valor: The Stolen Valor Act
and Government Regulation of Speech Under the First Amendment, B.C. L. REV.,
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=1927590
(contending that SVA amounts to unconstitutional restriction of free speech); and
Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor, & the Government's Good Name: Seditious Libel &
the Stolen Valor Act, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 136 (2012) (arguing that SVA is
unconstitutional for substantially the same reasons that the First Amendment forbids
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judicially took place in Alvarez, whose various opinions focused largely
on the threshold question of whether false statements of fact comprise an
237
unprotected category of speech. Having concluded that they do not, the
Ninth Circuit panel applied strict scrutiny to the SVA, leading almost
inevitably238 to the Act's invalidation.239 As discussed in Part III-A
above, this Article agrees that the Court has not treated the entire class of
false factual expression as beyond the bounds of constitutional
protection. This section seeks to show that the SVA illustrates why,
absent congruence with the principles discussed in Part II, even bans on
240lies that warrant society's disapproval violate the First Amendment.
Alvarez supplies an emblematic test case for the SVA, including
a strikingly unsympathetic defendant. A director of a local water board,
Alvarez introduced himself at a meeting as "a retired marine of 25
years." 241 Thus began a "series of bizarre lies" about Alvarez's
nonexistent military service that included a claim that he was awarded a
242Congressional Medal of Honor. With no real question of his violation
of the SVA, Alvarez pled guilty while reserving his right to appeal the
243Act's constitutionality.
Alvarez's false claim, however repugnant, underscores the case
for not broadly extending power to punish libel to other forms of
factually false assertions. Unlike the injury inherent in published
criminalization of seditious libel); and Julia K. Wood, Note, Truth, Lies, and Stolen
Valor: A Case for Protecting False Statements of Fact Under the First Amendment,
61 DUKE L.J. 469 (2011) (endorsing Ninth Circuit's decision in Alvarez invalidating
SVA).
237. See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1206-11, 1218-31 (Bybee, J., dissenting);
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 667-73 (9th Cir. 2011) (Smith, J.,
concurring), 677-87 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring), 678-84 (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting).
238. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing Court's application of strict
scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
239. See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1215-17.
240. See Robbins, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 819 (citation omitted) (interpreting SVA
to include scienter requirement).
241. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200.
242. Id. at 1200-01.
243. Id. at 1201.
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defamatory falsehoods,244 a spurious assertion of military glory does not
inevitably produce a particularized substantial harm. Nor did such a
premise form the basis for the SVA. Instead, Congress determined that
"[fjraudulent claims surrounding the receipt of ... [military] decorations
and medals awarded by the President or the Armed Forces of the United
States damage the reputation and meaning of such decorations and
medals."245 Likewise, the government successfully argued before the
Tenth Circuit that "Congress could reasonably conclude, as a matter of
simple common sense, that prohibiting false representations of having
earned military awards would serve to safeguard the integrity of the
,,246
awards. One need not dispute either of these propositions to find them
insufficient bases for suppression of speech. For the egregiously
undeserving Alvarez to be associated with the Congressional Medal of
Honor may in a sense dilute the meaning and integrity of that award.
This effect, however, is too diffuse and ephemeral to support criminal
sanctions under the First Amendment. Atmospheric injury may suffice
241for restrictions of the unique and unprotected category of obscenity,
but under normal principles of free speech abstract detraction from the
truth does not. Absent persuasive evidence of a more concrete harm-
e.g., adverse impact on military personnel2-false claims to these
awards should not be subject to censorship.
244. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
245. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2(1), 120 Stat. 3266
(2006).
246. Brief for Appellant, United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D.
Colo. 2010) (No. 09-cr-00497-REB-1), 2011 WL 1228792, at *16.
247. See supra notes 28-30 and 189-94 and accompanying text.
248. The court in United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo.
2010), rev'd, No. 10-1358, 2012 WL 247995 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2012), rejected the
government's argument that false claims to military honors could cause soldiers to
"lose incentive to risk their lives to earn such awards." Id. at 1190 (citation omitted).
This wholly unsubstantiated assertion is . . . unintentionally
insulting to the profound sacrifices of military personnel the
Stolen Valor Act purports to honor. . . . I find it incredible to
suggest that, in the heat of battle, our servicemen and women
stop to consider whether they will be awarded a medal before
deciding how to respond to an emerging crisis.
Id. at 1190-91.
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Moreover, it does not disparage the government's interest in
honoring recipients of these awards to require pursuit of this aim to
comply with the First Amendment. On the contrary, the Court has held
that even the ultimate symbol of the nation, the American flag, may not
be employed in a manner that infringes on freedom of speech. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,249 the Court sustained the
right to refrain from participating in a ceremony requiring students to
salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In the
precedent overruled by Barnette, the Court had reasoned that since
"[n]ational unity is the basis of national security," officials were entitled
"to select appropriate means for its attainment." 250 In Barnette, however,
the Court found no "grave and immediate danger" 251 to national unity as
embodied by the flag to justify this invasion of "individual freedom of
mind in preference to officially disciplined uniformity." 25 2 Similarly, the
Court ruled in Texas v. Johnson253 that the state could not invoke its
interest in "preserving the [American] flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity" 254 to convict Johnson for violating a law prohibiting
"[d]esecration" of a flag in a manner likely to "seriously offend"
25
observers. Johnson had set fire to the flag as part of a political
256demonstration. Since Johnson's violation of the law "thus depended on
the likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct," the Court
257
subjected his conviction to strict scrutiny. As in Barnette, the Court
found that the state had breached the fundamental constitutional
command that public authorities may not "'prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."'258
249. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
250. Jehovah's Witnesses in Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
595 (1940).
251. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
252. Id. at 639.
253. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
254. Id. at 410.
255. Id at 400 n. 1 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon West
1989)).
256. Id. at 399.
257. Id. at 411-12.
258. Id at 415 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
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To be sure, it is difficult to conceive of Alvarez's patent lie as
touching the rights of belief and conscience involved in Johnson and
Barnette. At a deeper level, however, the targeted suppression of such
claims implicates the ideas of epistemic skepticism and marketplace
dynamics reflected in those cases and in the Court's libel jurisprudence.
The Milkovich Court's rejection of a stark line between fact and opinion
arose from concern that substantively libelous statements might
259
otherwise find refuge in the disingenuous form of opinions. In another
sense, though, the danger can run in the opposite direction. To shelter
ideas while leaving factual expression to plenary government control
ignores an abiding First Amendment theme: wariness of government's
capacity and motives when acting as arbiter of truth. The same First
Amendment that constrains government from enforcing favored ideas
should not be construed to grant carte blanche to privilege favored facts.
260
While Alvarez's claim could be readily disproved, no similarly
objective gauge exists for distinguishing protected from proscribable
falsehoods in the absence of a requirement of harm. It may be intuitively
appealing to assume constitutional protection of falsehoods that are
, 261 . . 262interwoven into ideologies or intellectual inquiry, but a principled
standard for identifying these is elusive. Conversely, falsehoods like
Alvarez's claim may seem hardly worth protecting, but the purpose of
the First Amendment is to "protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation,"263 and the Court has repeatedly warned that ostensibly small
inroads on First Amendment safeguards pave the way for far larger
ones.264 A uniform requirement that appreciable harm be demonstrated to
259. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
260. See Tushnet, supra note 75, at 24 (asserting as major reason for validity
of laws like SVA "the ease with which the falsity of some factual statements can be
determined").
261. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
262. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 352 ("[A] per se rule of constitutional
protection might well apply to false statements about historical figures, historical
events, war news, or scientific theories.").
263. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
264. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("We cannot lose
sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance
of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege ... fundamental societal values are truly
implicated.") (finding violation of free speech); Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("[I]t is no defense to urge that the religious practices here
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strip falsehoods of protection avoids basing freedom of speech on official
265bias or judicial preference.
Vigilance against such bias, it will be recalled, was the impetus
for the Court's decision to strike down the hate speech ordinance in
R.A.V.266 In barring discriminatory bans on speech, the Court sounded a
267prominent theme in First Amendment jurisprudence. On its face, the
SVA does not discriminate against a particular viewpoint.268 The R.A. V
Court, however, was concerned with more than overt efforts to suppress
a specific message. Like St. Paul's ordinance, the SVA singles out for
"special prohibition[]" expression on "disfavored subjects."269 Moreover,
R.A. V recognized that a law's viewpoint discrimination can lurk in its
"practical operation" 270 as well as its formal restriction. Here, the SVA
enforces through selective sanction the view that military heroism and its
attendant glory merit elevation over acclaim attained through other
achievements.271 This perspective is likely shared by a large portion of
may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of
neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent
. . . .") (finding violation of Establishment Clause); see also United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) ("We cannot be influenced . . .by the
perception that the regulation in question is not a major one because the speech is
not very important.") (invalidating regulation of cable operators' transmissions).
265. See United States v. Strandlof, No. 10-1358, 2012 WL 247995, at *24
(10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2012) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If there is a common feature that
binds together the types of false statements enumerated in the Supreme Court's past
lists, it is something more than mere falsehood.") (arguing for invalidation of SVA).
266. See supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
267. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) ("[A]s a
general matter, 'the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content."' (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
268. See United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 820 (W.D. Va. 2011)
("[T]he speakers targeted by the law do not advocate any particular political or
cultural viewpoint or question prevailing dogma or beliefs about any historical or
scientific issue.").
269. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
270. Id.
271. It does not appear that absent more-e.g., testimony under oath-lies
concerning achievements like athletic feats, see, e.g., Martha Neil, Marion Jones
Gets 6 Months; Disgraced Olympian Lied About Steroids Use, ABA JOURNAL (Jan.
11, 2008, 11:51 AM), available at http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/marion
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the public. Comparable support, however, probably exists for the belief
that bigotry should yield to tolerance; still, the R.A. V Court struck down
an ordinance implementing that view on the ground that "majority
preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing
speech on the basis of its content." 272 Certainly in this case, appreciation
of exceptional courage by recipients of military honors does not require
the coercive force of law.273
While the SVA's discrimination may be more oblique than that
of St. Paul's ordinance, this consideration is offset by two factors. First,
the ordinance fell even though its prohibitions applied to a proscribable
category of speech; the antidiscrimination principle should obtain even
more rigorously when, as assumed here, a restriction does not affect a
traditionally unprotected category. Secondly, though the SVA is directed
at certain factual falsehoods about individual military performance rather
than commentary on military policy, the two topics cannot always be so
neatly cabined.274 The Cohen Court refused to "indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
jonesgets 6 months disgraced olympian lied aboutsteroids use/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2012), or humanitarian accomplishments, see, e.g., Questions over Greg
Mortenson's Stories, CBS NEWS (April 15, 2011, 6:00 PM), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/04/15/60minutes/main20054397.shtml?tag-c
ontentMain;contentBody (last visited Apr. 11, 2011), do not constitute per se
violations of federal law.
272. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 392.
273. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) ("To
believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of
the appeal of our institutions to free minds.").
274. The controversy over 2004 presidential candidate John Kerry's military
accomplishments and medals provides a notable illustration. See Jim Rutenberg,
Officer from Another Swift Boat Breaks Silence and Defends Kerry, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/22/politics/campaign
/22swift.html?pagewanted=all; (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) Kate Zernike, Veterans
Rebut 'Swift Boat' Charges Against Kerry in Answer to Challenge, N.Y. TIM ES (June
22, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/us/politics/
22kerry.html? (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). Another example is United States Senate
candidate Mark Kirk's inaccurate claim to have received the United States Navy's
Intelligence Officer of the Year award. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Illinois Republican
Senate Candidate Admits to Error on Navy Award, WASH. POST, (May 30, 2010),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/29
/AR2010052903510.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
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substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."275 Here, that risk is
not so remote as to qualify the SVA for R.A. V 's exception for content
discrimination whose nature "is such that there is no realistic possibility
that official suppression of ideas is afoot." 2 76
These principles apply with special force where the causal theory
of harm is attenuated and market deficiencies are not present to prevent
correction of falsehood through additional speech. When false
representation of military honors specifically and traceably secures
improper benefits, its perpetrator can no doubt be penalized.277 A
concrete adverse effect, however, is not categorically inherent in lies
about military credentials, as Alvarez's hollow boast attests. Established
First Amendment doctrine shields even the expression of ideas of proven
toxicity in the faith that their threat can be countered by additional
speech.278 It is consistent with this philosophy to trust the market, not
official sanctions, to confront falsehoods whose principal impact is their
moral offense. Lies like Alvarez's may well earn near-universal
condemnation. Still, once admitted, the power to restrain individual
liberty based on moral disapproval is not confined to this degree of
consensus.279 However disturbing Alvarez's speech, it did not warrant
275. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
276. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390.
277. See Brody v. Barasch, 582 A.2d 132, 133-34 (Vt. 1990) (affirming
decision to deny plaintiff license to practice psychology on basis of
mischaracterizations on plaintiffs resume).
278. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-28 (7th
Cir. 1985) ("Under the First Amendment the government must leave to the people
the evaluation of ideas. . . . A belief may be pernicious - the beliefs of Nazis led to
the death of millions, those of the Klan to the repression of millions.").
279. Upholding a conviction for homosexual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court found as adequate rationale for the law at issue "the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy
is immoral and unacceptable" Id. at 196. Overruling Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court disavowed the proposition that "the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce [its views on homosexual conduct] on the
whole society through operation of the criminal law." Id. at 571. A similar difficulty
attends the rationale that Alvarez misappropriated a species of government property.
See Parker, supra note 5, at 24. Johnson, too, could be seen as having
misappropriated a revered national symbol, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397,
422 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), but not in a manner that materially
undermined the operations of government.
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abandonment of the constitutional premise that further speech remains
the first resort for addressing noxious expression. Indeed, the exposure of
Alvarez's mendacity vindicates reliance on counterspeech as the First
Amendment's usual corrective mechanism.28 0
Like the statute struck down in Brown, the SVA is at once too
narrow and too broad. 28 1 It singles out a particular type of false self-
laudation for unconditional proscription, and reaches fictitious claims
that generate no material or irreparable harm. Disallowing punishment of
a braggart like Alvarez does not foreclose power to impose sanctions
282
where such lies induce tangible reliance and improper gain. Laws
prohibiting fraud represent an obvious instrument for pursuing many
283
such instances. R.A. V and Johnson offer precedent; in neither case did
the invalidity of the state's legal theory signify that the defendant's
conduct was intrinsically immune from punishment under a properly
284
crafted law. Similarly, here, those who seek redress against concrete
280. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010)
("Alvarez's lie, deliberate and despicable as it may have been, did not escape notice
and correction in the marketplace.").
281. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, U.S. , _, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2742 (2011) ("As a means of protecting children from portrayals of violence, the
legislation is seriously underinclusive, not only because it excludes portrayals other
than video games, but also because it permits a parental or avuncular veto. And as a
means of assisting concerned parents it is seriously overinclusive because it abridges
the First Amendment rights of young people whose parents (and aunts and uncles)
think violent video games are a harmless pastime.").
282. See Tushnet, supra note 75, at 3 n.9 ("[M]any false claims about having
received military honors appear to be made in connection with efforts to obtain
material benefit.").
283. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) ("The
State may, and does, punish fraud directly. But it cannot seek to punish fraud
indirectly by indiscriminately outlawing a category of speech, based on its content,
with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be prevented.").
284. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 n.1 (1992) (stating that
R.A.V.'s conduct might have violated Minnesota statutes forbidding terroristic
threats, arson, or criminal damage to property); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 n.8
("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to suggest that one is free to steal a flag
so long as one later uses it to communicate an idea. We also emphasize that Johnson
was prosecuted only for flag desecration-not for trespass, disorderly conduct, or
arson."); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365-67 (2003) (plurality opinion
of O'Connor, J.) (invalidating conviction of defendant for cross buming with intent
to intimidate on ground that jury instructions conveyed improper burden of proof).
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abuse of invented tales of military valor have adequate legal tools at their
disposal.28
CONCLUSION
The constitutional law of libel has been the main forum for
weighing the status of factual falsehoods under the First Amendment.
Perhaps most strikingly, the Court has carefully circumscribed the state's
ability to penalize even a class of speech so devoid of value and capable
of harm. From these decisions themes have emerged that illuminate the
conditions under which government can proscribe other kinds of
factually false expression. The current controversy over the Stolen Valor
Act offers an instructive case of the bounds of that power. Though surely
few would approve of false claims of military honors, the Court has not
granted government plenary authority to forbid even morally repugnant
lies simply because they are untrue. However noble the statute's goals, it
must comply with the guarantees of the Free Speech Clause.286 Requiring
bans on falsehood to be neutrally aimed at demonstrable harms while
preserving breathing space for valuable speech is not an onerous demand
under the First Amendment.
285. The Court appears not to have even ruled out the possibility of a statute
aimed at extraction of benefits through this specific misrepresentation. See United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) ("We . .. do not
decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of extreme
animal cruelty would be constitutional."). It is conceivable that the government
could show that lying about military honors is an especially potent falsehood for
misleading employers and other dispensers of benefits, and thus warrants special
deterrence.
286. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418 ("it is not the State's ends, but its means, to
which we object.").
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